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Oil Price Shocks and Cyclical Dynamics in 
an Asymmetric Monetary Union
Abstract
This paper analyzes the dynamic eﬀ  ects of anticipated and unanticipated oil price 
increases in a small two-country monetary union, which is simultaneously characterized 
by asymmetric wage adjustments and asymmetric interest rate sensitivities of 
private absorption. Common external oil price disturbances lead in this asymmetric 
macroeconomic setup to temporary divergences in output developments across the 
monetary union. In the case of anticipated oil price increases the relative cyclical 
position is reversed in the course of the adjustment process. Complete stabilization of 
the output variables throughout the overall adjustment process requires a restrictive 
monetary policy being time inconsistent from a quantitative but time consistent from a 
qualitative point of view. That means that the central bank credibly announces a future 
reduction in the growth rate of the nominal money stock but actually implements a 
reduction, which is less restrictive than the original announcement.
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1.   Introduction 
The establishment of European Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999 marks a fundamental 
change in the monetary regime in Europe. The transfer of responsibility for the conduct of 
monetary policy from the national central banks to the European Central Bank (ECB) implied 
that the former lost their ability to respond to country-specific cyclical developments. The 
ECB, in contrast, primarily monitors the macroeconomic situation at the aggregate European 
level in order to decide about the appropriate stance of the common monetary policy. Never-
theless, it also considers the country-specific output and inflation developments to be informa-
tive and relevant (see ECB, 2005 and 2007). Asymmetric cyclical dynamics within the mone-
tary union clearly complicate the design of ECB policy as the common stance may not be 
appropriate in all member countries. This tends to create tensions in the decision-making 
process. A high degree of business cycle synchronization within Europe generally facilitates 
ECB policy-making as the common monetary stance is more likely to be appropriate also 
from the respective national points of view. 
At about the same time with the establishment of the EMU, the longer-term trend of oil 
prices saw a remarkable reversal. The 1990s were mostly characterized by falling oil prices. 
However, beginning in 1998/99 the world has seen a substantial and persistent increase in 
nominal and real oil prices. Expressed in Dollar per Barrel, the price increased tenfold from 
about 10 dollars to currently about 100 dollars.
1 This secular oil price increase as well as the 
increase in oil price volatility raised professional interest in the impact of oil price changes on 
output and inflation as well as in the appropriate policy response by the monetary authorities 
in the US and in Europe. In this context, numerous papers argue that the macroeconomic im-
pact of oil prices cannot be assessed in isolation. The overall impact has to be analysed in 
conjunction with the endogenous reaction of monetary policy. Bernanke et al. (1997) first 
argued that systematic monetary policy responses to the inflationary impulse triggered by oil 
price shocks were an important additional source of aggregate cyclical fluctuations in the U.S. 
economy. This joint assessment of oil price shocks and systematic endogenous reactions of 
monetary policy has been examined in many subsequent papers (such as, for example, in 
Hamilton and Herrera (2004) or Carlstrom and Fuerst (2006)).
1   In July 2008, nominal oil prices marked their historical all-time high at even 140 US-dollars. They fell to 40 
US-dollars in conjunction with the severe economic downturn following the financial crisis and have more 
than doubled since then. Expressed in Euro per Barrel, the long-term increase is somewhat dampened by fa-
vorable exchange rate developments of the euro versus the dollar but still looks impressive. The nominal 
price of oil increased more than sixfold from about 10 to currently about 70 Euro per Barrel. These figures il-
lustrate the sustained longer-term upward trend of oil prices as well the considerable short-term fluctuations 
of oil prices. See ECB (2010) for more details. 5
Macroeconomic asymmetries are empirically relevant. The ECB (2010) finds considerable 
heterogeneity across the EMU member countries in their macroeconomic responses to com-
mon oil price shocks. The differences between the two large countries Germany and France 
are particularly pronounced. Germany (next to Belgium) experiences the strongest recession 
from a common oil price shock hitting the euro area. France, at the other end of the spectrum, 
shows over the medium term almost no response of real GDP to an increase in oil prices (see 
p. 83, Chart 5).
2 Peersman and van Robuys (2009) also find substantial heterogeneity across 
the EMU member countries in their responses to oil price shocks. 
Against this background this paper deals with the interesting question how the simultane-
ous presence of common external oil price shocks and endogenous monetary policy actions 
by the ECB feed through the member economies and how the member countries interact in 
the process of adjustment with each other and with the rest of the world. In principle, different 
cyclical developments within the monetary union may here arise from two sources: The 
member countries may respond differently to the common oil price shock and/or they may 
behave differently with respect to the endogenous monetary policy response by the ECB. 
This raises the question about the number and type of macroeconomic asymmetries to be 
included in the model, which generate cyclical asymmetries in response to uniform impulses 
from oil prices and the common monetary policy by the ECB. On the one hand, the model 
intends to include empirically relevant macroeconomic asymmetries across the EMU. On the 
other hand, we intend to focus on a limited set of asymmetries in order to be still able to solve 
the model algebraically without having to recur to numerical simulations.  The algebraic solu-
tion – which is provided in the technical appendix - allows for a more detailed discussion of 
optimal monetary policy. Furthermore, the complete adjustment dynamics as well as the con-
cept of time inconsistency can be illustrated by means of phase diagrams.
3
Concerning the type of macroeconomic asymmetries our model aims to capture existing 
asymmetries in the wage-price dynamics across the Euro area. A study by the ECB (2005) on 
the importance of regional factors in a heterogeneous monetary union finds that “a substantial 
part of persistence in price developments may stem from differences in wage developments 
2   This paper concentrates on the differential output dynamics following oil price shocks, excluding other ma-
croeconomic indicators. In principle, the impact on different price indicators and the respective rates of infla-
tion can be derived explicitly from the underlying model and also be illustrated in respective graphs.  Fur-
thermore, the behavior of cyclical unemployment in response to oil price shocks – as investigated econometr-
ically in Löschel and Oberndorfer (2009) – can be illustrated here in relation to the output gap measure. For 
brevity, these results are not shown. 
3 A similar approach is taken by Strulik and Trimborn (2009) who use phase diagrams in order to illustrate the 
dynamic effects of temporary fiscal stimulus in a microfounded real business cycle (growth) model in conti-
nuous time.  6
and wage-setting mechanisms across euro area countries (including, in some countries, the 
automatic indexation of nominal wages to prices)” (p. 68). After more than ten years of a 
common monetary policy in Europe there is now additional empirical evidence that wage-
price dynamics continue to differ considerably across the member countries (see, among oth-
ers, ECB (2010) and Carstensen et al. (2009)). Furthermore, Peersman  and van Robays
(2009) find in a comprehensive study of the effects of oil price shocks that the cross-country 
differences in Europe are primarily rooted in different so-called “second-round” effects. In 
contrast, differences in “first-round effects” do not seem to be the major driving force of cyc-
lical asymmetries in Europe. Asymmetric wage-price responses in Europe lead to different 
adjustment patterns in the member countries. Germany, for example, shows strong responses 
in wages and prices, whereas France shows almost no responses in these variables.
4
In consequence, this paper considers two types of asymmetries: On the supply side, we as-
sume asymmetric wage adjustment mechanisms. We look here at differences in the propaga-
tion mechanisms within the EMU and explicitly consider the cyclical implications of 
“second-round effects” of oil price increases stemming from asymmetric wage adjustment 
mechanisms. Asymmetric degrees of nominal wage flexibility are implemented by postulating 
different types of Phillips curves within the monetary union. On the demand side, the member 
countries are assumed to be characterized by asymmetric interest rate transmission such that 
the direct cyclical impact of the endogenous ECB policy differs across the EMU member 
countries.
5
Our specific focus on a limited set of two empirically relevant structural asymmetries al-
lows us to solve the model explicitly and to derive analytically the adjustment paths of the 
economies in response to oil price shocks as well as the appropriate reaction functions for 
monetary policy.
6 Furthermore, the complete adjustment dynamics can be illustrated by 
means of phase diagrams. The model can be interpreted as an IS/LM model augmented by a 
supply side with (1) a Phillips curve based on rational expectations of prices and exchange 
4   See Clausen (2002) for a more detailed discussion of labor market and other macroeconomic asymmetries in 
EMU member countries. 
5   See Clausen and Wohltmann (2005) for a more detailed motivation and analysis of the individual implica-
tions of this macroeconomic asymmetry. The empirical evidence on asymmetric interest rate transmission, 
especially comparing France and Germany, is somewhat inconclusive concerning the relative strength as 
some studies find a relativeley stronger impact in France, others find a relatively stronger impact in Germany 
(see Peersman (2004), table 1). We assume in the following for the sake of illustration France (Country 1) to 
be more strongly affected by interest rate impulses.  
6   The focus on different second-round effects and just these two asymmetries leaves out other types of demand 
or supply side asymmetries. In the following model setup we abstract for simplicity from asymmetries in the 
importance of oil in the production process across the member countries. In the definition of the consumer 
price index we do not allow for a direct impact of oil as a consumption good but allow only for an indirect 
impact via the final goods prices. Empirically, the cross-country differences in the importance of oil in the 
EMU member countries are limited in size (see, ECB 2003, p. 27). 7
rates and (2) imported oil in domestic production and (3) a long-run supply function.
7 We 
examine the short-, medium- and long-run effects of anticipated and unanticipated oil price 
increases on both member countries. This setup serves as a background for the analysis of 
monetary policy. We assume that the primary goal of monetary policy is price stability and 
investigate to which extent the ECB may also be able to dampen the differential cyclical de-
velopments within the monetary union caused by the common external price shock.
8
The analysis of anticipated oil price shocks and their implications for monetary policy ge-
nerates new insights concerning the notion of time consistency of monetary policy. We intro-
duce the novel distinction between qualitative and quantitative time inconsistency. Complete 
stabilization of the output variables throughout the overall adjustment process requires a re-
strictive monetary policy being time inconsistent from a quantitative but time consistent from 
a qualitative point of view. That means that the central bank credibly announces a future re-
duction in the growth rate of the nominal money stock but actually implements a reduction, 
which is less restrictive than the original announcement.  
Section 2 introduces our model. Section 3 analyzes the dynamic effects of anticipated and 
unanticipated oil price increases. Section 4 discusses the appropriate response by monetary 
policy to these price shocks. Section 5 summarizes our main results. The paper includes an 
appendix, which contains a detailed derivation of the analytical solution. 
2.  A Model of a Monetary Union  
We consider a monetary union, which consists of two member countries U1 and U2. The 
member countries are identical in size and the monetary union as a whole is considered as 
small relative to the rest of the world. Both member countries use imported oil for domestic 
production:
(1) ) ) ( ( )) ( ( 1 5 2 1 4 3 2 2 1 1 0 1 1 1 21 1 1 01 1 τ b p p b y b y b y b b g p i a y a a q
c − − − + + − + + − − + =
∗ 
(2) ) ) ( ( )) ( ( 2 5 1 2 4 3 1 2 2 1 0 2 2 2 22 2 1 02 2 τ b p p b y b y b y b b g p i a y a a q
c − − − + + − + + − − + =
∗ 
(3) ) ( 1 1 e p p + − =
∗ τ
                                                
7   The macroeconomic setup draws on earlier specifications in Wohltmann (1993 a and b) and Wohltmann and 
Clausen (2001a and b). In principle, the model equations can also be formulated in discrete time and simu-
lated with MATLAB-DYNARE (as done, for example, in Wohltmann and Winkler (2006)). They also pro-
vide a more detailed discussion on the microeconomic foundations of the model equations used in this paper. 
In this paper, we focus on the qualitative adjustment mechanisms in an asymmetric monetary union, which 
can be properly illustrated with a countinuous time specification.
8    The implications of this paper go well beyond the role of imported raw materials in an open economy. It may 
also be applied to all intermediate goods produced abroad and used for domestic production. We therefore 
use in this paper the terms oil imports, raw material imports or imports of intermediate goods interchangea-
bly. 8
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The notation is as follows:
9 q= real output,  y = real income, i = nominal interest rate, 
c p i  − = real interest rate, g = real government expenditure, p = producer price level of the 
domestically produced good, τ = final goods terms of trade, e = nominal exchange rate of the 
union with respect to the rest of the world expressed in units of domestic currency for one unit 
of foreign currency, m = nominal money stock in the union
10, w = nominal wage, π = trend or 
core rate of inflation, p
c = consumer price index, q = steady state level of q (natural level of 
output),
∗
R p = price of oil or of other intermediate good,  p e pR − +
∗ = real oil price, 
) ( e p p R + −
∗ = intermediate goods terms of trade. 
                                                
9   All variables – except for the interest rates  i1, i2 and i
∗ - are logarithmized. The variables of member country 
U1 (U2) are labeled with the lower case index „1“ („2“). Variables with a „∗“ describe foreign variables. A 
dot above a variable indicates the right-hand side derivative with respect to time; a bar indicates a steady state 
or long-run equilibrium value of the respective variable. All structural parameters in the equations (1)-(16) 
are taken to be positive. They can be interpreted as elasticities or semi-elasticities, respectively. 
10 The  monetary  aggregate  m is derived from the underlying LM equation through log-linearization. Denoting 
the underlying levels of the aggregate money stock with M and of money demand with ) 2 , 1 ( = j L P j
c
j , money 
market equilibrium implies  2 2 1 1 L P L P M
c c + = . Provided that the initial values of money demand are identical 
in both member countries and using the approximation  0 0 ln ln / M M M dM − ≈ it is possible to derive m = 
2(lnM-ln 2). 9
  The IS equations (1) and (2) describe aggregate demand in the two member countries of 
the monetary union. Goods market equilibrium in country Uj (j = 1, 2) requires domestic pro-
duction (qj) to equal the sum of real private absorption (first expression in brackets), real gov-
ernment expenditure (gj) and the difference between the real ex- and import of final goods 
(second expression in brackets). Real private absorption is assumed to depend negatively on 
the real interest rate and international trade in final goods (trade balance excluding imports of 
raw materials) negatively with respect to the terms of trade. Equations (3) and (4) define the 
terms of trade with respect to final goods. The IS equations are assumed symmetric except for 
different semi-interest elasticities of private absorption. We assume private absorption in U1
to respond more strongly to interest rates compared to U2 ( 22 21 a a > ).
11
The LM equation (5) reflects money market equilibrium in the monetary union. Money 
demand in country Uj is assumed to depend on domestic production qj, which is considered a 
more appropriate measure of the volume of transactions than real income yj. The nominal 
money stock m is deflated by the consumer price indices (13) and (14) to allow for the fact 
that in open economies money is also used for the purchase of imported goods. Perfect capital 
mobility within the monetary union as well as between the monetary union and the rest of the 
world implies uncovered interest parity (6). Interest rates within the union are equalized and 
may deviate only by the rationally anticipated rate of depreciation e  from the foreign interest 
rate i
∗.
  The equations (7) and (8) link domestic production qj with real income or gross national 
product yj. The difference originates from real intermediate imports. Real imports of raw ma-
terials (intermediate goods) can be expressed in non-logarithmized form as the product of the 
real price of raw materials ( j R P E P / ⋅
∗ ) and the physical import Rj.
12 Assuming for simplicity 
a proportional relationship between the quantity Rj and the (non-logarithmized) level of do-
mestic production Qj of the form  0) æ 1 ( æ > > ⋅ = j j Q R ,
13 we derive after a logarithmic-
linear approximation the equations (7) and (8) where  () æ 1 / æ − = ψ  provided that the initial 
                                                
11   It may be argued that the IS-equations are “myopic” as absorption depends on current income and does not 
follow from intertemporal optimization on part of the consumers. Note, however, that the presence of interest 
rates in the absorption equation implicitly captures and mimics intertemporal substitution and anticipation ef-
fects by consumers. 
12   In this paper, capital letters generally indicate non-logarithmized variables. 
13   See for more details also Findlay and Rodriguez (1977) and Buiter (1978). 10
value of the intermediate goods terms of trade  ) /( E P P R j ⋅
∗ is normalized to unity (Wohltmann
1993b).
14
The equations (9) and (10) describe price adjustment within the monetary union.
15 The 
rates of inflation in Uj are determined by a weighted average of domestic nominal wage infla-
tion and of the rate of change of the real price of raw materials expressed in domestic curren-
cy. The corresponding weights μ (1-μ) reflect the average shares of wage costs (raw material 
costs) in the overall variable costs of a representative firm.
16 The equations (9) and (10) are 
dynamic versions of mark up-price setting (Buiter 1979). 
The equations (11) and (12) describe the dynamics of wage adjustment in the monetary 
union. The rate of change of wages in Uj is determined by an expectations-augmented Phil-
lips-curve where inflationary expectations are given by the trend or core rate of inflation 
(πj).
17 We assume that wage setters in both member countries base their decisions on different 
time horizons. In U1, the trade unions take a long-run perspective. Their rate of nominal wage 
increases is linked to the rate of growth of the money stock in the monetary union, which in 
turn determines the long-run rate of inflation. In U2, wage setting is based on the rationally 
anticipated short-run development of consumer price inflation based on (14). Furthermore, 
both wage setting equations contain a component reflecting wage pressure, which is modeled 
according to Okun’s law using the output gap, i.e., the difference between actual and potential 
output. Without this wage pressure component ( 0 = δ ), the trade unions show insider-
outsider-behavior and the wage equation in U1 corresponds with nominal wage rigidity while 
wage setting in U2 can be interpreted as real wage rigidity based on the consumer price in-
dex.
18 Nominal wages are therefore more flexible in U2 than in U1. In U1, nominal wages only 
                                                
14   In production functions, which allow for factor substitution, the constant ψ depends on the elasticity of subs-
titution between factors of production and from the share of imported inputs in aggregate production. See
Bhandari and Turnovsky (1984). 
15   Another strand of the literature looks at asymmetries in the price setting equations and their implications for 
asymmetric price developments within a heterogeneous monetary union. Price setting in the service sector is 
typically slower than in other parts of the economy such that countries with a larger service sector are under 
otherwise unchanged circumstances characterized by larger degree of price rigidity (ECB 2005). We focus 
instead on asymmetric wage setting mechanisms and assume in our model symmetric mark-up price setting 
behaviour of firms.  
16   The expression 1-μ can be interpreted as a measure of the degree of openness of the economy on the supply 
side (Bhandari and Turnovsky 1984). In contrast, the parameter α3 in the price adjustment equations (13) and 
(14) reflect the openness of the economy with respect to the large foreign country on the demand side. 
17   See for more details also Buiter and Miller (1982) and van der Ploeg (1990). 
18   The OECD (2000) finds that the EMU member countries differ considerably in their degrees of wage flex-
ibility. For example, the degree of nominal wage flexibility in France is relatively small while being relative-
ly large in Germany (see table 11, p. 108). In contrast, the impact of the rate of unemployment on real wages 
has a similar magnitude in both countries. As long as the monetary union is assumed to consist of France (U1)
and Germany (U2) the parameter δ can be assumed to be identical in (11) and (12). More recently, Peersman
and van Robays (2009, p. 625) also find the degree of nominal wage flexibility in France to be very small 
compared with Germany. 11
respond to the output gap as long as the rate of monetary growth remains unchanged. In U2,
nominal wage changes  2 w   react via  2 π  to anticipated changes in the consumer price index. 
Consumer price inflation includes the anticipated rate of depreciation e , which, in turn, im-
mediately reacts to exogenous shocks. In consequence, the rate of change of nominal wages in 
U2 responds directly to the anticipated rate of depreciation e  . In U1, the rate of change is de-
termined by the constant rate of growth of the money stock. In contrast, producer price infla-
tion 1 p   and  2 p   respond in both member countries directly to e  . This can be directly seen 
from the price adjustment equations (9) and (10). 
Equations (15) and (16) describe long-run supply functions within the monetary union. In 
the long-run assuming labor market equilibrium, a neoclassical production function and a per-
fectly elastic supply of raw materials, goods supply depends positively on the final and inter-
mediate goods terms of trade and on the internal price differential (internal terms of trade).
19
In summary, our monetary union is assumed completely symmetric except for exactly one 
asymmetry in both, the demand and the supply side. On the demand side, U1 is characterized 
by a relatively higher interest sensitivity of private absorption. On the supply side, U2 is cha-
racterized by a relatively higher degree of nominal wage flexibility. We show in the following 
that as a result of these asymmetries oil price shocks generate adjustment dynamics in both 
member countries, which display considerable quantitative as well as qualitative differences 
within the monetary union. 
Using the solution method of Aoki (1981), the model is decomposed into an aggregate and 
a difference system. The aggregate system is derived by adding corresponding equations of 
U1 and U2. It describes the behavior of the monetary union as a whole. The difference system 
is derived by the subtraction of corresponding equations of U1 and U2. It describes the diffe-
rential developments within the monetary union. In previous work the method by Aoki has 
been predominantly applied to symmetric models. It can only be used in our asymmetric 
model when we assume identical weights α1 and α2 in the consumer price definitions (13) and 
(14), i.e., that consumers in the monetary union are indifferent between domestically pro-
duced goods and imports from the respective partner country (Clausen and Wohltmann 2005). 
The simplifying assumption α1=α2 may be justified for highly integrated monetary unions 
and allows us to solve the aggregate system independently from the difference system. With 
α1=α2, the price indices 
c p1  and 
c p2  are identical. In conjunction with the uncovered interest 
                                                
19  A more detailed theoretical derivation of the role of the terms of trade in aggregate supply is given in 
Wohltmann and Bulthaupt (1999) and Devereux and Purvis (1990). The supply equations (15) and (16) can 
also be derived by assuming static price and wage equations with full wage indexation in the long run.  12
parity (6) it follows that real interest rates are equalized within the monetary union 
(
c c p i p i 2 2 1 1   − = − ). In contrast, the producer price levels p1 and p2 and the corresponding 
rates of producer price inflation  1 p   and  2 p  differ across the monetary union. The arithmetic 
mean of the solutions to the aggregate and the difference system yields the solution paths for 
the output and price developments in the individual member countries. The detailed analytical 
derivations are provided in the appendix. 
3.   Effects of an Oil Price Increase 
This section analyzes the dynamic effects of anticipated and unanticipated increases in the 
price of imported oil ( 0 d >
∗
R p ) on both member countries. In the case of an anticipated in-
crease in  ∗
R p , we assume that the price increase is credibly announced in t = 0 and happens at 
the later date T > 0. An unanticipated price shock comes as a surprise to the private sector and 
happens already at t = 0. Both types of shocks have identical effects in the steady state but 
differ in their implications for the adjustment dynamics. 
Effects on the Aggregate Monetary Union  
The long-run or steady state effects of an oil price increase result from the equilibrium 
condition 2 1 ) ( 0 p p p m      − = − = = τ  for the dynamics of the aggregate and the difference sys-
tem.
20 In long-run equilibrium, member country outputs q1 and q2 equal their long-run levels 
1 q  and  2 q  according to the long-run supply functions (15) and (16). An oil price increase 
leads in the monetary union to a decline in aggregate union output  2 1 q q q + = , which is even-
ly distributed across the monetary union (d 1 q =d 2 q <0).
21 It follows that asymmetries in wage 
setting or in the interest sensitivities of aggregate demand do not affect the ultimate impact of 
oil price shocks on member country outputs  1 q  and  2 q . One reason is that in our model pro-
ducer price inflation  p  = 1 p  + 2 p  , the rate of depreciation e  and consumer price inflation 
c p  =
c p1  +
c p2   are ultimately only determined by the rate of monetary growth in the union 
(
c p e p m     = = = 2 ). The second reason is that oil price shocks of the form  0 d > ∗
R p  leave no-
                                                
20  The long-run is considered as the imaginary period in which the dynamic adjustments of the aggregate and 
the difference system are completed. In the case of the aggregate variable we have τ and p: 2 1 τ τ τ + = ,
2 1 p p p + = .
21   In contrast, an isolated increase in the price of imported final goods (dp
∗>0) leads to an increase of q . In this 
case,
* * d / d d / d R p q p q − =  holds. 13
minal and real interest rates as well as the internal price differential p1-p2 ultimately unaf-
fected. In contrast, the external terms of trade based on final goods  2 1 τ τ τ + =  change in the 
long run. Provided that 
(17) ) 0 1 ( ) ( 2 1 1 3 2 1 1 5 > − + − = ⋅ > + − > b b a f b b a b λ λ ψ
holds, the oil price increase leads to a fall in the aggregate terms of trade ( 0 d / d
* < R p τ ).
22
The first inequality in (17) ensures that the long-run IS curve in the  q / τ -diagram has a 
„normal“ negative slope
23, while the second inequality ensures that the long-run IS curve in 
Figure 1 moves in response to 0 d >
∗
R p further to the left than the upward-sloping long-run 
aggregate supply curve (AS).
24
The jump in oil prices  0 d > ∗
R p  normally leads to a permanent decline in the real money 
stock ( 0 d / ) ( d
* < − R p p m ). Provided that the nominal money stock is constant ( 0 = m  ) this is 
equivalent to a permanent increase in the aggregate producer price level p = p1+ p2.
25
                                                
22  As common in the analysis of small countries, we assume here that the increase in the oil price leaves the 
foreign price level of the foreign final good unaffected. For a relaxation of this condition see Wohltmann and 
Winkler (2006). Provided that (17) holds, an increase in p
∗ leads to  0 d / d d / d
* * > − = R p p τ τ . The nominal 
exchange rate e can only achieve a stationary long-run equilibrium as long as the nominal money stock in the 
union remains constant ( 0 = m  ). In this case we find, given (17),  0 d / d
* > R p e  and, respectively, 
0 d / d
* < p e , i.e., an increase in the price of imported raw materials (final goods) leads to a real and a no-
minal depreciation (appreciation) of the common currency. Due to  0 2 ) ( 2 c p p q y R − − + ⋅ + =
∗ ∗ ψ τ ψ  we also 
find in the case  0 d >
∗
R p  ( 0 d >
∗ p ) an overproportionate fall (rsp. increase) in real income  2 1 y y y + = rela-
tive to real output q .
23  The standard assumption of a „normal“ reaction of the trade balance to changes in the final goods terms of 
trade τ  is insufficient because an isolated increase in τ raises private absorption due to 
0 2 ) ( 2 c p p q y R − − + ⋅ + =
∗ ∗ ψ τ ψ .
24  Using a CES production function, the parameter f3 can be linked to the variable factors labor and imported 
raw materials as follows  μ μ σ β / ) 1 )( ( 3 − + = f  (Wohltmann and Bulthaupt 1999); where β indicates the 
real-wage elasticity of the labor supply and σ  the elasticity of substitution between labor and imported raw 
materials. The second inequality in (17) holds provided that the sum of both elasticities is sufficiently small. 
25   We find 
* d / ) ( d R p p m− < 0 if and only if  ψ λ α ψ α ) ( ) ( ) ( 2 1 1 1 1 3 3 5 1 2 1 1 3 b b a l f f b l b b a + − + + < + − . This con-
dition holds if  0 1 1 3 < − l f α  or if  5 b  is sufficiently large. 14
2 1 τ τ τ + =
1 Q
0 Q
• 0 ) (τ
2 1 q q q + =
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Figure 1: Long-Run Effects of an Oil Price Increase 
The dynamics of adjustment of the aggregate monetary union to an oil price increase can 
be illustrated in a phase diagram including the state variables τ  and m-p (Figure 2).
26 The 
points Q0 and Q1 denote the initial and the final equilibrium of the aggregate system and S0
and S1 the corresponding convergent saddle paths. The dynamic adjustment of the state vector 
(τ , m-p) in response to an anticipated oil price increase shows on impact a discontinuous 
jump from Q0 to B (or B’). It is followed by a movement along a trajectory, which converges 
asymptotically to the unstable branch I0 belonging to the saddle point Q0 (BC or B’C’). After 
the implementation in T, the system moves along the unique convergent saddle path S1 to the 
new long-run equilibrium Q1.
27
  The anticipation of a future increase in oil prices leads on impact to a real depreciation 
of the common currency. It equals the nominal depreciation due to the assumption of short-
run price rigidity. The size of the instantaneous fall in the terms of trade τ is inversely related 
to the time span T between the announcement and the actual implementation of the price in-
                                                
26   We use the real variables τ and  m-p as state variables in the phase diagram because steady state values of the 
nominal exchange rate e and the aggregate price level p do not exist in the presence of a positive rate of 
growth of the money stock. The terms of trade τ  are taken as a jump variable as it includes the forward-
looking variable e. As a result of price rigidity, the producer-oriented real money stock m-p is taken as prede-
termined. In contrast, the consumer-oriented real money stock m-p
c is a non-predetermined variable because 
the aggregate consumer price index 
c c c p p p 2 1 + =  includes the jump variable e.
27  It is assumed here that  0 d / d
* < R p τ  and 
* d / ) ( d R p p m− < 0, which prevail as long as the weak condition   
(17) holds and provided that b5 is sufficiently large. Moreover, it is assumed that Q1 remains below the unst-
able branch I0. The theoretical possibility that Q1is located above I0, which arises for example with extremely 
large values of  b5 or  ) (
2
1
22 21 2 a a a + = , is considered as empirically irrelevant. 15
crease. We find „undershooting“ of the final goods terms of trade in point B in the case of a 
long time span T and „overshooting“ in B’ given a short span. In the extreme case of an unan-
ticipated increase in 
∗
R p  (T=0), the impact effect is given in B
∗ on the saddle path S1where the 
size of the impact depreciation reaches its maximum. 
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Figure 2: Effects of an Oil Price Increase on the Aggregate Monetary Union 
After the immediate impact depreciation the real depreciation of the common currency 
continues further in the case of an anticipated price increase. This adjustment pattern differs 
from the case of an unanticipated price increase.  Furthermore, in the adjustment process fol-
lowing the impact effect the real money stock m-p subsequently falls because the real depre-
ciation ( 0 < τ  ) and the implicit nominal depreciation e  cause nominal wage increases in U2,
which in turn raise the aggregate rate of producer inflation beyond the level determined by the 
initial rate of monetary growth ( 0 m p   > ). The parallel development of the terms of trade τ
and of the real money stock m-p ends at the date of implementation T. In the case of a “large” 
T, i.e., that the time span between the anticipation and the implementation is relatively long, 
we find for t>T a continuation of the real depreciation, which leads in conjunction with the 
discontinuous fall in the rate of inflation in T to an increase in the real money stock (adjust-
ment path CQ1). For “small” values of T (and, in particular, in the special case T = 0) we find 
after the implementation in T a real appreciation, which is accompanied by a further reduction 
in the real money stock (adjustment path C’Q1). The adjustment dynamics ultimately settle at 
the new final equilibrium Q1 on the saddle path S1 irrespective whether T is “small” or 
“large”.  16
  The aggregate real interest rate and the rate of real appreciation τ   behave inversely due 
to
(18) τ α     ) 1 ( 2 ) ( ) ( 3 2 2 1 1 − − = − = − + −
∗ i p i p i p i
c c c    (
c c c p p p i i i 2 1 2 1 ,    + = + = )
and because the foreign interest rate i
∗ is considered exogenous. A real depreciation of the 
common currency (τ  < 0) implies that real interest rates in Europe 
c p i  − exceed their steady 
state level and vice versa. In Figure 2, the rate of real appreciation τ   is negative throughout 
the period up to T such that the aggregate real interest rate 
c p i  − exceeds its steady state level 
(2i
∗).
28 The increase in 
c p i  − is accomplished despite the initial increase in the rate of infla-
tion
c p   by an even stronger increase in the short-term nominal interest rate i.
29 At the date of 
implementation T, the rate of appreciation τ   increases discontinuously, which implies a si-
multaneous fall in the aggregate real interest rate. For „small“ T, the aggregate real interest 
rate remains for t > T below its long run level 2i
∗, while remaining above this level for „large“ 
T. In the long-run, the real interest rate returns to its initial steady state level (2i
∗).
  The effect on aggregate demand and output  2 1 q q q + =  in the period  T t < < 0  is cha-
racterized by two opposing influences. The real depreciation of the common currency increa-
singly improves the unions trade balance and increases due to (17) aggregate demand. On the 
other hand, the increase in the aggregate real interest rate reduces real private absorption. Pro-
vided that the weak condition
(19) 3 2 3 2 1 1 5 2 3 ) 1 ( ) ) ( ( )) 1 ( 2 ) 1 (( α μ α ψ μ μ α a b b a b l − > + − − − + +
holds, the impact effect of an anticipated oil price increase on aggregate output  2 1 q q q + =  is 
on balance positive:  0 ) 0 ( q q > + .
30 Given (19), the anticipation of a future oil price increase 
leads to an immediate expansion in aggregate output in the monetary union.
31
                                                
28   After the impact effect, real interest rates increase continuously up to T.
29   The rise in i follows from the uncovered interest parity (6) and the increase in the rate of depreciation e .
30  Inequality (19) holds if the terms of trade elasticity of the trade balance (b5) is large relative to the interest 
sensitivity of private absorption (a2). In this case, the expansionary terms of trade effect dominates the con-
tractionary real interest rate effect. Condition (19) also holds if the semi-interest elasticity of money demand 
(l2) is sufficiently large. In the special case without imported raw materials ( 0 , 1 = = ψ μ ) condition (19) 
simplifies to  3 2 3 5 2 3 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( α α α a b l − > + . This condition ensures that an anticipated increase in the rate of 
monetary growth m   leads on impact to an increase of aggregate output (Wohltmann and Clausen 2001a). 
Given a role for imported raw materials in domestic production, condition (19) ensures that an anticipated in-
crease in m   again leads to an expansionary impact effect on output.  17
) 0 ( + q
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Figure 3: Aggregate output effects in the monetary union 
  The subsequent development of aggregate output up to T is theoretically ambiguous. On 
the one hand, the external trade balance successively improves following the discontinuous 
depreciation on impact and subsequent further reductions in the terms of tradeτ . On the other 
hand, the real interest rate increases and lowers the interest-sensitive part of private absorp-
tion. With realistic empirical parameterizations, the contractionary real interest rate effect 
dominates the expansionary terms of trade effect such that aggregate output q falls after the 
initial expansion. The fall in aggregate output typically continues even below the initial equi-
librium value  0 q  (Figure 3), except for very small values of T. In T, the implementation of 
the oil price increase leads – notwithstanding the fall in real interest rates - to a discontinuous 
fall in output, which can be explained using (7) and (8) by the fall in real income y  in T and 
the implied fall in aggregate demand.
32 The size of the contraction in T does not depend on the 
time span between the anticipation and the implementation of the oil price increase.
33 For 
“small” values of T, union output experiences a convergence from above to the new steady 
                                                                                                                               
31  This result critically depends on the “normal” reaction of the trade balance with respect to changes in the 
terms of trade based on final goods, i.e., that the assumption  0 5 > b  already holds in the very short-run. This 
assumption was already made in the overshooting model by Dornbusch (1976) and also in Buiter and Miller
(1982). The case  0 5 < b  (abnormal reaction of the trade balance) leads to a positive determinant of the dy-
namic aggregate system and to the loss of the saddle path property of the system. Moreover, we continue to 
assume that domestic production responds immediately and perfectly elastic to changes in aggregate demand. 
Assuming instead a Lundberg lag in domestic production where supply responds sluggishly to changes in ag-
gregate demand, output remains predetermined on impact and increases only gradually over time in response 
to an anticipated increase in imported raw materials. 
32   For y = y1+y2, the link with domestic production is given by  . 2 ) ( 2 0
* * c p p q y R − − + + = ψ ψτ  Contrary to q,
y falls already on impact ( 0 ) 0 ( y y < + ) due to  0 ) 0 ( τ τ < +  and also in the subsequent adjustment process. As 
*
R p  jumps in T, y experiences another discontinuous contraction in T.18
state value of q, which is lower than the initial equilibrium value.
34 In contrast, for sufficiently 
„large“ values of T, q converges to the new steady state value  1 q  from below (cf. Figure 3). 
Output Effects in the Individual Member Countries 
As a consequence of the assumed asymmetries on the supply and the demand side, the 
cyclical developments in response to the symmetric oil price shock  0 d
* > R p  differ in the in-
dividual member countries. Differential output developments within the monetary union are 
captured by the output differential  2 1 q q q
d − = . The solution path of 
d q  in response to an 
anticipated oil price increase typically looks as in Figure 4. Anticipating in t=0 the price in-
crease in T > 0, both countries experience a discontinuous and (due to our assumption 
2 1 α α = ) identical increase in real interest rates. This leads in U1 to a relatively stronger fall 
in aggregate demand than in U2 because of the assumed asymmetry in the interest sensitivity 
of private absorption ( 22 21 a a > ). The immediate real depreciation of the common currency 
improves the trade balance and increases aggregate demand symmetrically. In consequence, 
on impact and in the early period of adjustment output in U2 is higher than in U1, In other 
words, the output differential is on impact negative: 0 ) 0 ( < +
d q . This initial cyclical differen-
tial favoring U2 relative to U1 changes quantitatively and even qualitatively over time in re-
sponse to changes in the internal and external terms of trade. The internal terms of trade 
2 1 p p pd − =  fall over time as a consequence of differential inflation developments within 
the monetary union.
35 This improves the internal competitiveness of U1 compared with U2 and 
the bilateral trade balance of U1within the union. Furthermore, U1 experiences a decline in the 
respective external (final goods) terms of trade  1 τ  on impact and also in the subsequent ad-
justment process, which goes beyond the corresponding decline of  2 τ  for U2 such that the 
improvement of the trade balance of U1 with respect to the large foreign country exceeds the 
                                                                                                                               
33  This result holds generally and follows from the fact that the jump variable τ  remains continuous in T. In 
contrast, the size of the initial jump clearly depends on T. See Turnovsky (2000), pp. 187 ff. 
34  This statement also holds in the special case T = 0. The initial jump in q is ambiguous in sign because the 
shock  0 d
* > R p  has a negative impact on y and therefore also on private absorption while on the other hand 
the terms of trade worsen and the real interest rate falls. A realistic empirical parameterization suggests 
0 ) 0 ( q q < + .
35   The initial period of adjustment is characterized by  1 2 π π >  and  1 2 q q >  and following (11) and (12) 
) 0 ( ) 0 ( 1 2 + > + w w   . The dynamic price adjustment equations (9) and (10) then imply ) 0 ( ) 0 ( 1 2 + > + p p   .19
one of U2.
36 Viewed in isolation, the developments of the internal and external terms of trade 
following the impact effect result in a larger expansionary effect on  1 q  than on  2 q . It follows 
that the output differential  2 1 q q qd − = increases after the negative impact effect. Apart from 
that, the rise in real interest rates exerts a negative impact on both member countries. This 
effect is assumed to be stronger in U1 than in U2 and causes therefore a decrease in the output 
differential 
d q . As long as the difference between the interest sensitivities of private absorp-
tion is sufficiently small, the terms of trade effects dominate the real interest rate effect on 
d q such that on balance the output differential increases after the negative impact effect. The 
increase in 
d q  is rooted in the fall in the producer price differential 
d p , whose development 
is driven by the respective inflation differential. The rate of producer price inflation in U1 is 
relatively lower ( 2 1 p p   < ) due to different wage dynamics in the anticipation period 
T t < < 0 . This follows from two factors: First, the rate of consumer price inflation 
c p   ex-
ceeds on impact for  T t < < 0  the constant rate of monetary growth m   and increases even 
thereafter.
37 Second, the output gap in U1 (i.e., the difference  1 1 q q − ) and the corresponding 
rate of wage inflation are higher than the corresponding values in U2.






small  large 
U t * t
0 =
d q
Figure 4: Development of the output differential 
                                                
36   In the period 0 < t < T, the relationship  ) ( 5 , 0 1
d p + = τ τ  and the fall in τ  and 
d p  imply that  1 τ  also falls. 
For ) ( 5 , 0 2
d p − = τ τ  we find  1 2 τ τ >  where after the initial discontinuous fall in t = 0+ it can not be ruled 
out theoretically that  2 τ subsequently increases. 
37   Not only 
c p   but also  2 1 p p p    + =  increases continuously in the interval T t < < 0 . The effect on  p   is small-
er (underproportional) than on 
c p  due to 0 3 < = − τ α   
c p p . In contrast, q generally falls after the (typically) 20
  The country-specific developments in the internal and external terms of trade lead in the 
course of the adjustment process to a reversal in the relative cyclical impact of the oil price 
shock across the monetary union. Technically speaking, they lead to a sign change in the solu-
tion time path of the output differential, which occurs at the latest at the date of implementa-
tion T. More formally, we find a date of a cyclical reversal  t
U with 0 < t
U ≤ T such that q
d < 0 
(or q1 < q2) holds for t < t
U and q
d > 0 (or q1 > q2) holds for (at least sufficiently small) t > t
U.
The reversal date t
U occurs before the date of implementation T as long as the period between 
the anticipation and the implementation of the oil price shock is sufficiently long (cf. Figure
4). In the case that the period is very short, t
U coincides with T.
38 The special case T = 0 with 
an unanticipated price shock always leads to q
d > 0. 
  At the date of implementation T, the output differential q
d increases discontinuously 
because the real interest rate rises and lowers by assumption private absorption in U1 more 
strongly than in U2. The rise in the output differential in T is associated with a discontinuous 
increase in the inflation differential  2 1 p p p
d    − = , which was negative up to T.  The subse-
quent development of q
d depends on the time span between the anticipation and the imple-
mentation of the oil price increase. For “small” values of T, q
d increases somewhat even 
beyond T because the rate of inflation in U2 remains in this case initially above the one in U1
( 1 2 p p   > ). The inflation differential 
d p   continues to be negative and the price differential 
2 1 p p p
d − =  falls accordingly. In the long run, the price differential 
d p  returns to its initial 
level 0 =
d p  such that 
d p  needs to increase for sufficiently large t > T, which requires a pos-
itive inflation differential ( 0 2 1 > − = p p pd    ). Simultaneously, the external terms of trade   of 
U1 , 1 τ  , improve and U1 experiences a decline in international competitiveness. The output 
differential q
d needs to fall for sufficiently large t > T in order to return toward the end of the 
adjustment process to the initial value  0 =
d q .
                                                                                                                               
positive impact effect such that as the result of the anticipation of a future price increase in imported raw ma-
terials the monetary union experiences stagflation.
38   The solution path of q
d has a reversal date t
N in the interval 0 < t < T, which is independent from T. For suffi-
ciently “large” T, we find t
N < T and therefore t
U(=t
N) < T. If, in contrast, T is sufficiently “small”, T < t
N
holds such that a reversal date t
U does not exist in the interval 0 < t<  T . We then find q
d < 0 for all t < T but 
q
d > 0 for t > T (provided t is not too large), as q
d increases discontinuously in T, and because the jump in T is 
independent from T and always larger than  ) (t q
d  for any t < T. The real income differential y
d = y1-y2 also 
experiences for T > 0 a reversal at  T t
K ≤ . Due to 
d d d p q y ψ + =  and p








  For sufficiently “large” T, q
d starts to fall immediately after the initial increase in T
because producer inflation in U1 is higher than in U2 ( 2 1 p p   > ) and the price differential 
d p
increases correspondingly for t > T. In contrast with the case of a “small” T , the system may 
experience another date of reversal t
* > T where the output differential again changes sign (it 
turns negative). Given a “large” T, the price differential may increase for sufficiently large t
beyond the steady state level 0 = d p  due to strong asymmetries in nominal wage develop-
ments across the monetary union. The member country U1 experiences a loss in international 
competitiveness. At the reversal date t
*, the output differential q
d turns again negative and 
converges therefore for t > t
* toward  0 =
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Figure 5: Output developments in individual member countries 
Output developments in the individual member countries are given in Figure 5.
40 They 
represent linear combinations of the solution paths for aggregate and differential output. We 
showed for empirically realistic parameterizations that aggregate output q = q1 + q2 expe-
riences a discontinuous increase on impact and a monotonic decline in 0 < t < T. The output 
variable q2 therefore increases on impact and subsequently falls. In contrast with q2, q1 does
not necessarily increase in the early phase of the adjustment process because the difference 
variable 2 1 q q q
d − =  falls. Furthermore, q1 does not necessarily experience a contraction in 
the interval 0 < t < T due to the fall of the price differential 
d p  and of τ . In Figure 5, we 
                                                
39   The second date of reversal t
* only exists for sufficiently large values of  T. For “intermediate” values of T, q
d
converges monotonically for t > T from above toward the steady state value  0 =
d q .
40   The qualitative developments of real output and real income y1 and y2 are identical. 22
present the most realistic case that q1 falls on impact as well as in the subsequent adjustment 
process. However, the size of the subsequent contraction in U1 is smaller than in U2 such that 
after the date of reversal t
U, q1 stays above q2. At the date of implementation T, both countries 
experience a discontinuous contraction, which turns out to be larger for U2 than for U1. In the 
case t
U = T, i.e., for T being „small“, both countries experience a monotonic convergence of 
their output levels from above to their respective new steady state levels, which are below the 
initial value. Output q1 remains hereby consistently above q2. In contrast, with t
U < T, i.e., T is 
sufficiently „large“, q1 and q2 experience divergent developments in the adjustment process 
following the discontinuous contraction in T. While q1 continues to fall, q2 experiences an 
expansionary process because the price differential  2 1 p p p
d − =  increases for t > T while 
the terms of trade  ) ( 5 , 0 2
d p − = τ τ  simultaneously fall such that the international competi-
tiveness of U2 improves. For sufficiently large t, i.e., after the second date of reversal t
*, q2
stays above q1. In the long run, output levels in both member countries converge to the same 
equilibrium level. 
4.  Reaction of Monetary Policy to Oil Price Increases  
This section investigates the ability of monetary policy to facilitate the absorption of antic-
ipated and unanticipated oil price shocks in an asymmetric monetary union. Related to EMU, 
the primary concern of the ECB is the achievement of price stability, which we interpret in 
our model as to minimize consumer price inflation. Furthermore, according to the Treaty of 
Maastricht and to the stability pact the ECB is expected to support the general economic poli-
cy of the member countries. Monetary policy actions are here considered conducive to this 
goal when they dampen business cycles at the aggregate level and also cyclical divergences 
within the monetary union caused by exogenous shocks.
  The analytical solutions to the aggregate and difference system determine the conditions 
to be met and the policies needed for stabilization.
41 More formally, business cycles at the 
aggregate level of the monetary union as well as asymmetric developments within the mone-
tary union can be avoided if the constants A1, A2 and  2
~
A  in the solution for the state vector 
() ′ − ) ( , p m τ  are all set equal to zero. Setting A1 = A2 = 0 removes any anticipation effects, 
i.e., the overall system remains up to the date of implementation T in the initial steady state. 
Setting in addition  2
~
A = 0, anticipated oil price increases do not lead to further adjustment 
                                                
41   See the appendix. 23
dynamics of the aggregate and difference variables, i.e., the system jumps in T immediately
into the new steady state. 
  In the special case T = 0, i.e., of an unanticipated increase in oil prices, complete stabi-
lization of the aggregate and the difference system is achieved as long as monetary policy sets 
0 ) ( d
~
2 = − − = p m A . Taking the rate of growth of the aggregate money stock m   as the mone-
tary instrument, the common central bank has to change m   such that the steady state value of 
the real money stock remains unchanged.
42 An increase in oil prices leads in isolation to a 
permanent fall of the real money stock.
43 An increase in m   by one unit leads ultimately to a 
fall in the real money stock where the size is determined by the semi-interest elasticity of 
money demand (l2). The total differential  
(20) 0 d
) (










m l p m 
















This contractionary monetary policy implies that both member countries achieve imme-
diately without any further dynamic adjustments the new (lower) steady state level of the out-
puts q1 and q2 and cyclical divergences within the monetary union are prevented because the 
common real interest rate remains with this policy tied to its initial level.
44 The reduction in 
the rate of monetary growth in response to the exogenous oil price shock does not only pre-
vent temporary inflationary processes in the member countries but also lead to a permanent 
reduction in the rates of inflation 
c p1   and 
c p2  . The restrictive monetary policy (21) is there-
                                                
42   In contrast to changes in the growth rate of the money stock m  , one-time changes in the level of the money 
stock m do not have any lasting effects on the real money stock. We therefore consider only changes in the 
growth rate in the discussion of monetary stabilization.  
43   This case prevails as long as b5 is sufficiently large. 
44   Setting  0
~
2 = A  implies the following behavior of the aggregate q = q1 + q2 and the difference variable q
d = q1
– q2: ) ( 0 1 q q q < ≡ , 0 = ≡
d d q q  for all t > 0. Furthermore,  0 ≡ τ   such that following (18) real interest rates 
also remain constant. This implicitly assumes that the foreign interest rate i
* remains unaffected by the price 
increase. An increase in the foreign interest rate i
*in response to the materials price increase leads in isolation 
to a permanent rise in the level of nominal and real interest rates in the union. This causes a permanent output 24
fore also consistent with the primary goal of ECB monetary policy of achieving price stability 
based on the consumer price index. 
  The stabilizing impact of the contractionary monetary policy (21) with respect to the 
aggregate system is illustrated in Figure 6. Viewed in isolation, an unanticipated oil price 
increase leads to the adjustment process Q0B
*Q1 while the stabilizing monetary policy (21) 
creates the opposite development of the state variables τ  and m-p (adjustment path ' ˆ
1 0 Q B Q ). 
With the simultaneous and unanticipated occurrence of both shocks ( 0 d * < R p , 0 d < m  ), the 
aggregate system moves instantaneously into the new steady state Q2. Q2 is vertically below 
the initial equilibrium Q0. In comparison, Q2 is characterized by a fall in the terms of trade τ
at an unchanged equilibrium real money stock m-p.
Figure 6 also illustrates the combined effects of the monetary policy reaction to antic-
ipated oil price increases (T >0). In contrast with the case T = 0 monetary policy has to react 
twice in order to achieve stabilization of the complete system throughout the entire adjustment 
process. This is due to the fact that with anticipated shocks adjustment dynamics in the aggre-
gate and difference system not only occur for t>T but also prior to the implementation at T.
Full system stabilization in the period 0 < t < T requires the credible announcement of a mon-
etary policy, which exactly neutralizes the anticipation effects of the future price shock.
45 The 
anticipation of the future increase in 
*
R p  leads in the phase diagram (Figure 6) to the time 
path Q0BC (for T “large“) or  C B Q ′ ′ 0  (for T “small”); the central bank designs its monetary 
policy such that the corresponding adjustment runs exactly opposite to Q0BC (or  C B Q ′ ′ 0 ),
which is  C B Q
~ ~
0  (or  C B Q ′ ′ ′ ′ 0 ). This requires at the date of anticipation t = 0 the credible an-





















                                                                                                                               
differential between the member country with the lower interest sensitivity of private absorption ( 0 d <
d q
or, respectively,  ) d d 2 1 q q <  (see Wohltmann and Clausen 2001a). 
45   More formally, in the solution of the state vector () ′ − ) ( , p m τ  the constant A2 (=  -A1) is set equal to zero.  
46  (22) is more contractionary than (21) because the element h12 of the corresponding eigenvector is negative 











As long as this reaction of monetary policy in T is considered credible and therefore antic-
ipated by the private sector, the aggregate as well as the difference system remain up to T in 
the initial steady state Q0. The output variables q = q1 + q2 and q
d = q1 – q2 satisfy in the pe-
riod T t < ≤ 0 : 0 q q =  and  0 =
d q . Moreover, inflation remains constant in this period 
( 0 m p p
c    = = ) such that the anticipation of the monetary policy reaction (22) avoids stagfla-
tionary developments within the monetary union, which are otherwise caused by the anticipa-
tion of the future increase in oil prices. 
  If the central bank fully implements the announced reduction in monetary growth and giv-
en that the oil price increases in T, the system moves in the period  t > T continuously accord-
ing to the state vector () ′ − ) ( , p m τ  along the initial saddle path S0 belonging to Q0 to the 
new equilibrium in  0 Q′ . In comparison with the new steady state Q1 in the case of a passive 
monetary policy ( 0 d = m  ), we find here a permanent increase in the real money stock.
47 In 
contrast with the case  0 d = m  , the real interest rate now increases in T
48 such that aggregate 
output q = q1 + q2 falls on impact below the new steady state level  ) ( 0 1 q q <  and converges 
subsequently to  1 q  from below. The output differential q
d = q1 – q2 immediately falls in T due 
to the interest rate increase and the relatively stronger response of private absorption in U1.
49
In contrast with the case of a passive monetary policy where the negative output differential 
already occurs at the date of anticipation t = 0, it is shifted here to the date implementation T.
A complete stabilization in the period t > T, i.e., the removal of any adjustment dynamics, will 
only be achieved if monetary policy does not fully reduce the growth rate of the money stock 
as previously announced but conducts instead in T a less restrictive monetary policy. The re-
quired reduction in m   is determined by the condition that both impulses taken together – the 
price shock and the policy response - do not change the equilibrium real money stock. Draw-
ing on (20) and (21), the size of the reduction in m   equals the case T = 0.  
                                                
47   Taken individually, the restrictive monetary policy announced in t = 0 and implemented in T > 0 generates 
the adjustment path  1 0
~ ~ ~
Q C B Q  (for T large) or  1 0
~
' ' ' ' Q C B Q  (for T small). The necessary fall in the rate of 
growth of the money stock is larger than the policy response to an unanticipated shock (T=0). Correspon-
dingly, the steady state-increase in the equilibrium money stock turns out to be higher ( 1
~
Q  in comparison 
with  1 Q′ ). 
48   The movement of the aggregate system from Q0 to  0 Q′  along the saddle path S0 implies a continuous decline 
in the terms of trade τ  ( 0 < τ  ). Eq. (18) then implies that the real interest rate exceeds throughout this period 
its steady state level 
* 2i .
49  A passive monetary policy ( 0 d = m  ) would lead in T to a fall in interest rates and therefore to a disconti-
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Figure 6: Monetary policy reactions to oil price increases 
The phase diagram (Figure 6) shows that the deviation from the previously announced 
and therefore anticipated contractionary monetary policy implies that the state vector 
() ′ − ) ( , p m τ  jumps in T in response to both, the oil price increase and the correction of ex-
pectations by the private sector, vertically onto the saddle path S1 into point B
*. The unantici-
pated changeover to a less restrictive monetary policy in T causes another vertical jump but 
now in opposite direction into Q2. The aggregate variables remain constant afterwards and no 
further adjustment dynamics take place such that the point Q2 – like in the special case T = 0 –
represents the new final equilibrium of the system.
50 This two-stage monetary policy design 
also stabilizes the difference system completely, i.e., avoids any cyclical differences in output 
or price developments within the monetary union. Moreover, the rate of inflation within the 
monetary union is permanently reduced. 
                                                
50   Taken in isolation, the increase in the price of imported raw materials generates an adjustment path from B
*
to Q1 along the saddle path S1. In contrast, the contractionary monetary policy (21) causes after the initial 
jump B
*Q2 the mirror image adjustment process Q2E along the somewhat higher located saddle path S2. With 
both shocks occurring simultaneously, the aggregate system jumps immediately into the new steady state Q2
and remains there thereafter. 27
The announcement or anticipation of the contractionary monetary policy (22) and the ac-
tual implementation of a less restrictive monetary policy means that in quantitative terms the 
behavior of monetary policy is time inconsistent. In contrast, monetary policy remains time
consistent in qualitative terms because the previously announced and the actual course of 
monetary policy still move in the same direction. The quantitative deviation of the actual poli-
cy from the announced reaction function (22) does not seriously undermine the reputation of 
monetary policy (this holds the more as price stability as the primary goal of monetary policy 
is still achieved). Finally, the regime switch from the previously announced or expected mon-
etary policy reaction (22) to the actual course followed (21) achieves complete stabilization. 
Business cycles at the aggregate level as well as cyclical differences within the monetary un-
ion resulting from anticipated increases in oil prices can be completely avoided.
  The derivation of the policy decision rules (21) and (22) assumed that the increase in the 
oil price leads to price changes within the monetary union but leaves the foreign price level 
∗ p  unchanged. This assumption is unrealistic as, for example, the oil price hikes initiated by 
the OPEC countries caused increased inflation worldwide. Viewed in isolation, an anticipated 
and an unanticipated increase in the price of imported final goods ( 0 d > ∗ p ) incur adjustment 
dynamics at the aggregate level of the monetary union, which run opposite to previous effects 
of an oil price increase.
51 The steady state effects on real variables and relative prices in the 
system are quantitatively identical but opposite in sign provided that 
∗ ∗ = R dp dp .
52 In contrast 
to the case of oil imports, a price increase in imported final goods leads to jumps in the exter-
nal terms of trade τ  not only at the anticipation date but also at the date of implementation T.
This stems from the fact that an increase in p
* leads per se due to  ) ( 2
* e p p + − = τ  to a dis-
continuous fall in τ .
  Monetary stabilization in the simultaneous presence of price increases in intermediate 
and final goods requires the following: given the realistic assumptions that the oil price in-
crease leads to an underproportional increase in the foreign price level ( 1 d / d
* * < R p p  or, re-
                                                
51   In contrast with the previous case 0 d >
∗
R p , the constants A1, A2 and 2
~
A  now change their sign in the solution 
form of the state vector. The absolute values of the constants are not equal to those in the case 0 d >
∗
R p . It 
follows that the adjustment dynamics in response to  0 d >
∗ p  are not an exact mirror image to the effects 
caused by an identical increase in the price of imported raw materials.  


















τ τ  and 
0 / ) ( / ) (
* * > ∂ − −∂ = ∂ − ∂ R p p m p p m . Analogous results can be derived for the case of immediate price ad-
justment for the state variables  w τ  and m-w.28
spectively,
* * d d 0 R p p < < ) and lagged adjustment in the domestic price level, unanticipated 
combined foreign price shocks can be perfectly neutralized at the aggregate and the difference 
level by an adequate reduction in the rate of growth of the money stock. The policy reaction 
(21) is modified by replacing the isolated price shock  0 d
* > R p  by the (quantitatively smaller) 
combined shock  ) 0 ( d d
* * > − p pR .
53 The required fall in the rate of growth of the money stock 
in response an unanticipated combined foreign price shock is smaller than with an isolated 
increase in oil prices.
54 With anticipated combined foreign price shocks (T > 0) the system can 
be stabilized in the period between the anticipation and the implementation of the foreign 
price increases by the credible announcement in t = 0 of a policy implemented in T > 0:
55
(23) ) d d (
) ( 1

































This policy rule for monetary growth implies a contractionary stance ( 0 d
. <
ann m  ) when 
the oil price increase has a relatively small impact on the foreign price level p
*, i.e., as long as 
* * d / d R p p  is sufficiently small. In this case, both terms in (23) are negative
56 and the monetary 
policy rule is time consistent in qualitative terms. If monetary policy pursues in T in order to 
stabilize the system after T a less contractionary stance than previously announced
57, the di-
rection of monetary policy remains unchanged. In contrast, if
* dp  is large relative to
* d R p  or 
the difference 
* * d d p pR − sufficiently small, we find  0 d
. >
ann m  . The stabilization of the com-
plete system requires the announcement of an expansionary but the later conduct of a contrac-
                                                















































  if 
. d d
* * p pR >
54   This is due to the fact that the adjustment dynamics following a foreign price increase in final goods  0 d
* > p
mirror those arising from 0 d
* > R p , and, furthermore, due to our assumption
* * d d p pR > .
55   (23) simplifies with  0 d















































56   The first expression in brackets in (23) is only negative, if 
* dp  is sufficiently small or, respectively,   
* * d d p pR −  is sufficiently large.  
57   The monetary policy actually conducted in T is identical to the case T = 0 and equals the second term in (23).  29
tionary monetary policy. Policy is time inconsistent in both, in quantitative and qualitative 
terms. This undermines the credibility of monetary policy and causes the central bank to lose 
reputation.
5.   Summary and Implications 
This paper investigates the dynamic effects of anticipated oil price increases in an asym-
metric two-country model of a small monetary union. The union is characterized on the 
supply side by different wage setting behavior of trade unions and on the demand side by dif-
ferent interest sensitivities of private absorption. Wage setting behavior in U1 is supposed to 
consider the growth of money supply in the union and is therefore fairly rigid with respect to 
other types of shocks (here taken as France), whereas wage growth in U2is linked to the short-
run variation of the consumer price index with a higher degree of wage-price flexibility (here 
taken as Germany). Furthermore, private consumption in France (member country U1) is sup-
posed to respond more strongly to the interest rate than in Germany (country U2). It is shown 
that a stagflationary process for the whole union starts even before the oil price increase takes 
place. Furthermore, as a result of the macroeconomic asymmetries cyclical divergences occur 
within the monetary union throughout the entire adjustment process. The direction of the cyc-
lical divergence depends on the short-run reaction of the real interest rate. On impact, real 
interest rates increase and from the perspective of U1 we find a negative cyclical differential 
within the monetary union.
58 In the subsequent adjustment process, the changes in the internal 
and external terms of trade of U1 strengthen its international competitiveness and improve its 
relative cyclical position within the monetary union. At some stage during the adjustment 
process, even a complete reversal of the cyclical differential takes place. It happens at the lat-
est when the price increase is implemented.  
In the special case of an unanticipated price increase, the monetary union does not expe-
rience a cyclical reversal between the member countries. In the case of sluggish price adjust-
ment, the output level q1 in U1 remains due to a relatively larger interest sensitivity of aggre-
gate demand and to the fall in the level of real interest rates consistently above the output lev-
el q2 in U2.
59
                                                
58   It can be shown that on impact the direction of the real interest rate change and, consequently, the direction 
of the cyclical divergence within the monetary union crucially depend on the asymmetry on the supply side. 
Given a symmetric setup in which wage setting in both countries is linked to consumer price inflation we find 
that the anticipation of a future price increase in imported raw materials leads on impact to a fall in the real 
interest rate and from the perspective of U1 to a positive output differential. 
59   In the case of full price flexibility, real interest rates increase and q1 remains below q2 throughout the entire
adjustment process. See for more details Wohltmann and Clausen (2003). 30
  It is shown that the adjustment dynamics following of oil price increase (in particular, 
the stagflationary consequences) as well as cyclical divergences within the monetary union 
can be avoided by a countercyclical monetary policy.
60 In the case of an unanticipated in-
crease in the oil price, sluggish price adjustment and the condition that the price level of im-
ported final goods increases less than proportionately it is necessary to reduce the rate of 
monetary growth in the union. This policy response ensures that the output variable and the 
external terms of trade immediately attain their new (lower) long-run equilibrium values and a 
permanently lower rate of inflation in the union.  
  In the case of an anticipated increase in the oil price, complete stabilization in both pe-
riods, i.e., the period between the anticipation and the implementation as well as the period 
after the implementation, requires a qualitatively time consistent monetary policy, which on 
impact credibly announces for the date of implementation of the price increase a contractio-
nary monetary policy taking the form of a reduction in the rate of monetary growth but reduc-
es at the actual implementation date the monetary growth by a relatively smaller amount than 
the original announcement. The direction of the actual policy is consistent with the announced 
change such that the credibility of monetary policy remains intact. However, monetary policy 
encounters a time-inconsistency problem in the presence of anticipated oil price increases if it 
is accompanied by a sufficiently large increase in the price of imported final goods.  
  Overall, we show that even in the presence of asymmetric degrees of wage flexibility 
within the monetary union the competitiveness channel continues to work as an important 
equilibrating mechanism. Cyclical differentials within the monetary union incur differential 
wage and price developments, which render cyclical asymmetries to be self-correcting over 
time. This competitiveness channel is considered by the ECB as the main mechanism to cor-
rect cyclical imbalances within the monetary union (ECB, 2007, p. 80f).  We show that de-
spite the heterogeneity in the macroeconomic structures within the monetary union the com-
petitiveness channel still contributes to the cyclical synchronization within the monetary un-
ion. This helps to explain the relatively small dispersion of output growth differentials within 
the euro area after the introduction of the euro (again see ECB, 2007).
Whether cyclical reversals take place in the course of the adjustment process, i.e., changes 
in the relative cyclical position of union member countries, generally depends (1) on the type 
                                                
60 One attractive feature of our model is that the specification allows us to one-time changes in long-run price 
level and permanent changes in rate of monetary growth and inflation. It is evident that a one-time permanent 
increase in the oil price can ultimately only generate one-time changes in the long-run equilibrium price lev-
el, but not persistent stagflation. Our more general model in the tradition of Buiter and Miller (1982) allows 
for both, one-time changes in the price level and transitory effects on inflation but also for permanent 
changes in the rate of monetary growth and inflation. 31
of the underlying disturbance and (2) on the nature and composition of asymmetries in the 
transmission mechanism. It depends on the nature of disturbance because anticipated and un-
anticipated both imply cyclical differentials, but only anticipated oil price shocks lead to a 
cyclical reversal in the course of the adjustment process. After an unanticipated oil price in-
crease, in contrast, output remains higher in country 1 relative to country 2 throughout the 
whole adjustment process. The dependence on the nature and composition of asymmetries can 
be illustrated by the following example. Unanticipated monetary policy leads in the simpler 
model with just asymmetric interest rate transmission by Clausen and Wohltmann (2005) al-
ways to a cyclical reversal. In this extended model including asymmetries on the supply as 
well as on the demand side, we find that unanticipated monetary policy does not lead to a cyc-
lical reversal. 
The fundamental adjustment mechanisms that govern the cyclical dynamics in response to 
common oil price shocks continue to operate in more realistic settings allowing for a larger set 
of different macroeconomic asymmetries across the Euro area member countries. However, 
the integration of further asymmetries requires numerical simulations, which go beyond the 
purpose and scope of the present paper. Another important issue not covered in this paper 
concerns the nature of the shock, supply versus demand. While the oil shocks in the 70s pre-
dominantly originated from the supply side, more recent price hikes emerge from strong 
growth in emerging economies, especially China. Obviously, the EMU member countries are 
not only affected by the oil price hikes per se but simultaneously also by other changes in the 
economic conditions in the global economy. The analysis of this question is left for future 
research.  
                                                                                                                               32
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Appendix
Aggregate and Difference system 
Using the decomposition method by Aoki (1981) the model (1)-(16) is transformed into the 
following set of equations using either aggregate or difference variables:
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The equations (A1)-(A6) describe the aggregate system while the equations (A7)-(A10) 
represent the difference system. 
Model Reduction 
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The LM equation (A3) can be reformulated as 
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The determinant  21 12 22 11 1 d d d d − = Δ of (A15) reduces to  Δ − = Δ /
~
5 1 b μ . In the case  0
~
5 > b
and 0 > Δ , we obtain a negative determinant  1 Δ and the system (A15) displays the saddle 
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Assuming  0 1 < Δ  implies one unstable and one stable root, which we define as  2 1 0 r r > > .







































We assume that  0 11 > h  and  0 12 < h .
An increase in the price of imported raw materials/intermediate goods ( 0 d
* > R p ) or in im-
ported final goods ( 0 d
* > p ), which is announced in t = 0 and implemented in T > 0, results in 
the following state vector  ) , ( ′ − p m τ , which describes the unique convergent time path 
from the initial equilibrium  ) ) ( , ( 0 0 p m− τ  to the new long-run equilibrium 
) ) ( , ( 1 1 p m− τ :
61
                                                
61   See Wohltmann and Clausen  (2001a). The expression 
t rj e  in (A18) and (A19) represents 
). 2 , 1 ( ) ( exp = j t rj38
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The constants A1, A2 and  2
~
A  are determined by three conditions: assuming price rigidity, the 
variable p m−  is predetermined and therefore required to remain continuous at t = 0 and t = 
T while the jump variable τ  satisfies at the date of implementation T the condition 
* d 2 ) ( ) ( p T T − = − − + τ τ .
62 In the special case T = 0, i.e., with unanticipated foreign price 
shocks, the solution time path is only given by (A19) where  ) ( d
~
2 p m A − − = . The steady state 
solution to the system (A15) is determined by  p m    − = = 0 τ . The steady state responses  
0 1 ) ( ) ( ) ( d p m p m p m − − − = −  and  0 1 d τ τ τ − =  to foreign price increases 
( 0 d
* > R p ,0 d
* > p ) can be derived from the total differential of the IS equation, the long-run 
supply function and the LM equation: 
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An isolated price increase in imported raw materials ( 0 d
* > R p ,0 d
* = p ) leads in the steady 
state to  0 d < τ  and  0 ) ( d < − p m . In this case we find A2 > 0 while  2
~
A  turns out to be posi-
                                                
62  The nominal exchange rate e is a component of τ  and responds discontinuously only at the time of an-
nouncement t = 0. In the case  0 d
* = p , τ  remains continuous in T.39
tive (negative) for sufficiently small (large) values of T. In contrast, an isolated price increase 
in imported final goods ( 0 d
* = R p ,0 d
* > p ) ultimately leads to  0 d > τ  and  0 ) ( d > − p m .
Correspondingly, A2 < 0 and  0
~
2 < A  (0
~
2 > A ) for T sufficiently small (large). 
Using (A19), the unique convergent saddle path for the aggregate system S follows as: 
(A22) ( ) ) ( ) ( 12 p m p m h − − − = −τ τ
Due to h12 < 0 the saddle path has a negative slope in the phase diagram.  
The difference system (A7)-(A10) can be reduced to the following dynamic equation govern-
ing the predetermined variable  2 1 p p p
d − = :
(A23) τ μγ μ     1 0 ) (
2
1
) ( + − + − = p m p p r p
d d d
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+ + γ μ      for  t > T40
where . d 0 1
d d d p p p + =  This solution path is everywhere continuous.
63 In the case  0 d
* > R p  or 
0 d
* > p  we have  0 d =
d p  because foreign price changes affect both member countries sym-
metrically in the long run.
64 We assume the initial values of corresponding variables in both 
member countries to be identical such that  0 0 0 = =
d d y p . As a result of asymmetric parame-
ters in interest rate transmission ( 0 ~
2 > a ) the difference of IS equations (A7) requires in con-
junction with  0 0 =
d y  the additional assumption  02 01 a a > .
Cyclical differences within the union are described by the output differential  2 1 q q q
d − = . It 
follows from (A7) and  0 ) 0 ( < + τ   (given T > 0) so that 
d q  falls on impact discontinuously:
65
(A26) 0 ) 0 (
æ
) 1 ( ~
) 0 (
1








The subsequent decline in the price level differential  2 1 p p p
d − =  generates a continuous 
increase in 
d q .
66 The decline of the internal price differential 
d p  can be inferred from (A23): 
(A27) 0 ) 0 ( ) 0 )( (
2
1
) 0 ( 1 < + + + − = + τ μγ μ     p m p
d
                                                
63   See Wohltmann and Clausen (2001a) for the case without imported raw materials ( 0 , 1 = = ψ μ ).
64   In contrast, an increase in the level of foreign interest rates ( 0 d
* > i ) leads due to  0 ~
2 > a  and following (A7) 
and (A10) to  0 d <
d p  and  0 d <
d q .
65   In the special case T = 0 we find  0 ) 0 ( > +
d q  as a result of  0 ) 0 ( > + τ  .
66   In the case that the difference in the semi-interest elasticities  21 a  and  22 a  is very large, 
d q  may even decline 
somewhat further after the initial discontinuous fall on impact. This case, however, is empirically very unrea-
listic and therefore considered irrelevant.  